Does stronger tax capacity promote development, or can it instead expand a state's ability to extract? We study the Single Whip Reform in Ming China, which consolidated heterogeneous taxes and labor obligations into standardized silver payments. We develop a model with an enforceable land-tax quota, a flexible surtax collected through relationship-specific central oversight and local effort, and predatory over-collection induced by collectors' personal liability. Silver commutation makes revenue more legible and remittable, allowing the center to reduce local retention, while official collection can simultaneously curb informal predation. Because net local fiscal resources finance public goods, the reform lowers population growth when the losses from local spending and higher formal taxation exceed the gain from de-predation. Using the Wanli Accounting Records, we find no precisely estimated average increase in total tax burdens, but larger increases for distant locations and heavy tax items. Silverization is associated with higher central fiscal claims and lower local claims on average. Recorded population subsequently grows more slowly in distant and grain-intensive regions, although these demographic estimates and the silver-access instrument require cautious interpretation. Administrative improvements can therefore centralize fiscal control without necessarily generating local development.